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This article seeks a nuanced understanding of the troubled state that Russian journalism finds 
itself in today. As much as the Kremlin may be blamed as the source of these woes, it cannot 
be responsible for low ethical standards and lack of solidarity amongst journalists. This article 
explores what has hindered the journalistic community from developing stronger ethical 
standards over the past 25 years. Three significant events in the first post-Soviet decade 
serve as case studies: first, an early ethical code of conduct, the Moscow Charter of 
Journalists, produced in 1994; second, the 1996 presidential election campaign, which led to 
president Yeltsin's victory over the communist Gennadii Zuiganov; and third, the so called 
“information wars” between oligarchs, culminating in the 2001 demise of the television 
channel NTV. In unique interviews, conducted by the authors, 35 Russian elite journalists and 
media managers assessed the role they played in major political events and how these 
events impacted on the freedom of media in Russia today. 
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Power Lost and Freedom Relinquished: Russian 
Journalists Assessing the First Post-Soviet 
Decade 
 
By the mid-2010s, journalism in Russia was in such a state that observers of the 
industry viewed it in the gloomiest light.2 So much so that in 2015 Russia scored 83 
out of 100 negative points in terms of press freedom, which put it on par with Saudi 
Arabia and worse than Tadzhikistan, Iraq, Somalia, Sudan and Zimambe. 3  A 
consequence of this has been that many journalists have changed or left the 
profession and the rest work in an ethical vacuum, where propaganda supercedes 
professional standards. The little independent journalism that is left is struggling to 
survive.4 To put the blame for this exclusively on the Putin regime would be too 
	
1 Schimpfössl is grateful to The Leverhulme Trust for enabling this research through the award of a 
Leverhulme Early Career Fellowship. 
2 Aleksandr Baklanov, “Pozner zaiavil o smerti zhurnalistiki v Rossii,” Snob, May 25, 2015, accessed 
August 16, 2016, http://snob.ru/selected/entry/92939. 
3 Freedom of the press – 2015, Freedom House, accessed August 16, 2016, 
https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2015/russia. 
4 See, for example, Leonid Parfёnov, “Zhurnalistika nikomu ne nuzhna,” Meduza, March 17, 2015, 
accessed August 16, 2016, https://meduza.io/feature/2015/03/17/zhurnalistika-nikomu-ne-nuzhna; 





simplistic. In this article, we set out to explore the reasons why the journalist 
community failed to establish any ethical standards and has never become a Fourth 
Estate, despite the considerable power many of them exerted during perestroika and 
the early 1990s. We also ask how journalists assess this experience today.  
 
The 1990s era and its impact on Russia’s further development provide the backdrop 
to our discussion. We choose this decade not because we rate it as more important 
than the Soviet legacy or the developments in the new millennium, but because of its 
relative distance and proximity to the present day. For the youngest generation, 
some of whom have just recently entered the journalistic profession, it lies too far 
back to have any personal memories, while many older journalists remember the 
1990s as the most bustling and enthralling times. For many, however, these years 
were traumatizing – so traumatizing that, for example, Konstantin Ernst, the head of 
Channel One decided not to include the decade when illustrating Russia’s 
contemporary history in his direction of the Sochi Winter Olympics opening 
ceremony: “I tried to think of a metaphor for the 1990s, but any honest metaphor 
would have been distressing.”5 Referring to the brutality and violence which ruled 
throughout the decade as well as job loss, impoverishment and dropping living 
standards, he concludes that the time is not yet ripe for dealing with those negative 
emotions.   
 
Given the multiple experiences of the 1990s, it is little surprising that the contenious 
lines of discussion have run both along the differing memories and views, as well as 
along the different generations when, in the mid-2010s, a lively debate about the first 
post-Soviet decade was unleashed.6 We asked journalists representing a range of 
political views and two generations, first, how they assess their role back then and 
the role of their predeccessors and, second, what impact they think this has on 
journalism today. Analyzing the replies to these questions, we try to find out which 
practices and events in the 1990s might have contributed to the loss of free 
journalism, and what contributed to journalists’ mutation from national icons in the 
perestroika period into professional PR people, the work of whom periodically 
crosses the fine line between journalism and propaganda.7 
 
In order to explore how journalists assess the impact of the 1990s on journalism 
today, we conducted interviews with 35 journalists and media managers (who are all 
former journalists). We split these interviews in two groups: the older generation who 
were the active members of the political-social-journalist life in the 1990s, most of 
whom had gained prominence in the last years of the Soviet Union. The second 
group consists of the young generation who began their career either in the late 
1990s or in the 2000s. Drawing such a dividing line is nothing new. Svetlana Pasti, 
Elina Erzikova and Wilson Lowrey split the journalistic community into the old 
generation, who started their careers in journalism in the 1980s, and the young 
generation, who came to the profession under Yeltsin and Putin.8  
	
4, 2013, accessed August 16, 2016, 
http://lenta.ru/articles/2013/02/04/krichevskaya/http://lenta.ru/articles/2013/02/04/krichevskaya/. 
5 Konstantin Ernst in discussion with the authors, March 13, 2016. 
6 See, for instance, Grigorii Iavlinskii, Periferiinyi avtoritarizm. Kak i kuda prishla Rossiia (Moscow: 
Medium, 2015) and the project ‘Ostrov-90’, Colta.ru, accessed August 16, 2016, 
http://www.colta.ru/ostrov90. 
7 Ilya Yablokov, ‘Russian Journalism’s Double White Lines’ Open Democracy Russia, 22 July 2016, 
accessed 16 August 2016, https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/ilya-yablokov/russian-media-s-
double-white-lines. 
8 Svetlana Pasti, “Two generations of Contemporary Russian Journalists,” European Journal of 
Communication 20 (2005): 89-115; Elina Erzikova and Wilson Lowrey, “Managed Mediocrity? 
Experienced Journalists’ perspectives on the ‘pampers generation’ of Russian reporters,” Journalism 






More than half of the journalists and media managers we interviewed work for 
regime-loyal media outlets, whilst the other half work for independent media or 
freelance. 21 respondents work in television, 11 for print media and 3 for online 
media. Media of all genres are represented; from tabloid and infotainment to news 
agencies and economic journalism. 10 respondents are females. The interviews 
were taken between March 2013 and March 2016. 30 out of 35 interviews were 
conducted face-to-face; four on Skype and 1 via Facebook messenger. Except for 
two interviews, which took place in London and New York, we met the respondents 
in Moscow, usually in their offices and in a few cases in their homes or in 
restaurants. The interviews lasted from half an hour to 2.5 hours. Four interviewees 
preferred to remain anonymous. The journalists’ voices are our empirical data, that 
is, these individuals acted as research subjects. In other words, despite their 
expertise and knowledge, we did not treat them as experts, but as agents, 
participants and witnesses of contemporary post-Soviet history. We scrutinized their 
narratives using content analysis.9 
 
Over the last two decades, our interviewees have undergone several re-
assessments of their own actions and of what they have experienced. Academic 
research to some extent concurs with the assessments they made, but in parts also 
diverges significantly. Dealing with the major issues that the journalistic community 
faced in the 1990s, Ellen Mickiewicz’s Changing Channels and Ivan Zassoursky’s 
Media and Power in post-Soviet Russia list the reasons why the media – the chief 
source of democratization in the perestroika period – turned into a major political tool 
of the Kremlin in the 2000s.10 They showed how fragile the equilibrium was in the 
1990s between balanced and biased reporting. Natalya Roudakova further 
elucidates the sharp demise of ethics during the turbulent socio-economic changes in 
the 1990s and the dramatic alienation within the community.11 Pasti, Erzikova and 
Lowrey complain that journalists in general, independent of the journalistic 
generation they belong to, are happy to cooperate with the authorities and perceive 
themselves as PR specialists, a professional identity which is partly influenced by the 
memory of the Soviet and first post-Soviet years.12  
 
Recent expert contributions to the field have given voice to people with first-hand 
experience in journalism, an important one among which was by Arkady Ostrovsky 
who worked in the post-Soviet era as Financial Times’ Russia correspondent.13 Many 
of these accounts give a sense of the big split within the media community and how 
the events in the recent past have further widened it.14 Olessia Koltsova’s, as well as 
our own works, provide insight into how newsrooms operate and what ethical ideas 
guide journalists in their work.15  Rolf Freidheim studied how the appointment of 
	
9 Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna S. Lincoln, Strategies of Qualitative Inquiry (Thousand Oaks: SAGE 
Publications, 2012). 
10 Ellen Mickiewicz, Changing Channels: Television and the Struggle for Power in Russia (Durham & 
London: Duke University Press, 1999); Ivan Zassoursky, Media and Power in Post-Soviet Russia (New 
York & London: M.E. Sharpe, 2004). 
11 Natalia Roudakova “Journalism as ‘Prostitution’: Understanding Russia’s Reactions to Anna 
Politkovskaya’s Murder,” Political Communication 26, no. 4 (2009): pp. 412-429. 
12 Svetlana Pasti, “Two generations of Contemporary Russian Journalists,” European Journal of 
Communication 20 (2005): 89-115; Elina Erzikova and Wilson Lowrey, “Managed Mediocrity? 
Experienced Journalists’ perspectives on the ‘pampers generation’ of Russian reporters,” Journalism 
Practice 6, no. 2 (2012): 264-279. 
13 Arkady Ostrovsky, The Invention of Russia: The Journey from Gorbachev’s Freedom to Putin’s War 
(London: Atlantic Books, 2015). 
14 Aleksandr Gorbachev & Ilya Krasi’shchik, Istoriia russkikh media 1989-2011. Versiia ‘Afishi’ (Moskva: 
Afisha Indastriz, 2011). 
15 Olessia Koltsova, News Media and Power in Russia (London: Rotledge, 2006), 118-160; Elisabeth 





editors, who are loyal to the Kremlin, affects the content of online journalism.16 In 
general, however, academics have focused on the peculiarities of media control by 
the state, rather than the role of journalists.17  
 
How journalists assess the impact of the 1990s on today, at a time when new 
restrictions on Russian media have been imposed, allows us to get a better 
understanding of the state the journalist community is presently in. To this end, we 
frame our media studies topic with a concept borrowed from political science when 
analyzing the three case studies. We refer to Vladimir Gel’man who, in his analysis of 
contemporary Russia, uses a framework that understands politics as a struggle 
between different actors who pursue the goal of gaining, wielding and maximizing 
power.18 Gel’man clarifies that in this power game actors (whether members of the 
ruling group or the opposition) use various resources and strategies to gain the upper 
hand in this struggle. The rest of society is involved on an occasional basis at best.  
 
The actors in our research are journalists and media managers. We pay particular 
attention to their endeavor to maximize power in the sense of increasing their 
personal influence, status and success.19 An important aspect of this approach is that 
it relieves the actors from being judged from a moral perspective, which can be very 
tempting when it comes to questions of ethics and solidarity. Instead, we see them 
as rational actors whose deeds, decisions and acts bore out of them being in a 
certain professional position and role under the specific circumstances of the 1990s. 
As Gel’man notes, Russian political actors in the post-Soviet period almost always 
took decisions which made the country move further away from democracy and 
closer towards becoming an authoritarian regime. From a perspective of building 
democracy, all the major junctures in political history of post-Soviet Russia were 
failures. However, it is wrong to assume that this chain of failures was in any way 
predestined. The actors in these processes could have as well made different 
decisions, which would have led to a very different scenario.20  
 
Our first case study has as yet never received any attention in Russian media 
studies; the Moscow Charter of Journalists compiled and set out in 1994. In the early 
1990s the power of prominent journalists, who were mainly based in Moscow, went 
far beyond the status journalists usually enjoy. Having gained a reputation of national 
opinion-makers in the 1980s, during perestroika and glasnost’, they knew they could 
set the tone.21 Thus, they also felt they had the responsibility to write down and 
eternalize the rules for their profession. In 1994 a group of 26 prominent journalists 
signed a charter aiming to introduce ethical norms and set standards based on a 
	
Russian media personalities and Reporters in the 2010s,” Democratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet 
Democratisation 22, no. 2 (2014): 295-312; Ibid, “Only the Wiliest Survive: Media Elites in Post-Soviet 
Russia and their Strategies for Success,” Russian Politics (2017, forthcoming). 
16 Rolf Freidheim, “The Loyal Editor Effect: Russian online journalism after independence,” Post-Soviet 
Affairs (2016), DOI: 10.1080/1060586X.2016.1200797 
17 Masha Lipman and Michael McFaul ‘”Managed Democracy” in Russia: Putin and the Press,’ Press/ 
Politics 6, no.3 (2001): 116-127; Sarah Oates, Television, Democracy and Elections in Russia (London: 
Routledge, 2006); Stephen Hutchings and Natalya Rulyova, Television and Culture in Putin’s Russia: 
Remote Control (London: Routledge, 2009); Scott Gehlbach, “Reflections on Putin and the Media,” 
Post-Soviet Affairs 26, no. 1 (2010): 77-87; Jonathan Becker, “Lessons from Russia: A Neo-
Authoritarian Media System,” European Journal of Communication 19, no. 2 (2004): 139-163; Natalia 
Roudakova, “Media-political clientelism: lessons from anthropology,” Media, Culture & Society 30, no. 1 
(2008): 41-59; Jesse-Owen Hearns-Branaman, Journalism and the Philosophy of Truth: Beyond 
Objectivity and Balance (London: Routledge, 2016). 
18	Vladimir Gel’man, Authoritarian Russia: Analyzing Post-Soviet Regime Changes (Pittsburgh: 
University of Pittsburgh Press).	
19 Ibid, 9. 
20 Ibid, 13-14.  





written code of conduct, thereby guiding journalists daily work throughout Russia. At 
the same time the ethical code of the Russian Union of Journalists emerged with 
similar content.22 We opted for the Moscow Charter of Journalists because it was the 
first attempt by Russian journalists to organize themselves and demonstrates the 
scale of symbolic power they were holding at that time.  
 
The 1994 attempt to spread their principles among the majority of professionals 
failed, and nothing was ever established that resembled a commonly accepted set of 
ethical principles. Some of those who had designed the 1994 ethical code went on to 
violate their own principles by participating in the massive propaganda machine, set 
up for the 1996 presidential election campaign, supporting Boris Yeltsin in his bid for 
presidency and, therewith, consciously and deliberately sacrifying their 
independence and previously held power. This forms the second and central case 
study within this research. The journalists’ role in the 1996 election campaign in 
support of then president Yeltsin has been considered a major blow to the media as 
an institution of civil society in Russia. It is of considerable significance for today’s 
journalists when thinking about the moment in the recent past when things started 
going wrong.23  
 
The third case study, which grew out of the previous one, deals with the information 
wars – the media battles in the second half of the 1990s between rival oligarchs, 
culminating in the demise of the private television channel NTV in 2001. This marks 
the beginning of the end of a period of relative press freedom and of independent 
journalism in Putin’s Russia. Journalists of all levels and ranks had by now become 
subordinate to their respective owner, completely losing their power status. They 
readily carried out the tasks set by the authorities and regime-loyal media owners. 
The authorities understood that they could dismantle independent and critical 
journalism without facing systematic and organised protest. These years laid the 
basis for what we have seen most glaringly since the annexation of Crimea; an easy 
readiness among journalists to take part in propaganda wars.  
 
The 1994 Charter of Journalists: defining professional principles 
 
When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Russian journalists were by and large 
oblivious of the idea of professional ethics. People who streamed into journalism in 
the late 1980s were most diverse; they were biologists, chemists, historians, 
schoolteachers, theatre critics and so on. Their lack of journalistic training partly (but 
only partly) explains their relaxed attitude to questions of ethics.24 Another reason 
was the emergency status people (felt they) lived in during those years. A Western 
journalist working in Moscow at that time remembers her colleagues’ confusion when 
she asked them why they were overtly taking sides when reporting news items, 
without respecting professional impartiality: “They perceived themselves as 
participants in a fight against the communists. They saw their primary task as 
overcoming the old regime. Pondering the niceties of ethics was not on their 
minds.”25 
 
When a group of 26 journalists took the initiative to draft ethical guidelines, this came 
as a surprise. These journalists had been friends for a while. In 1992 they created an 
	
22 “Kodeks professional’noi etiki rossiiskogo zhurnalista,” Soiuz zhurnalistov Rossii, June 23, 1994, 
accessed August 16, 2016, 
http://www.ruj.ru/_about/code_of_professional_ethics_of_the_russian_journalist.php. 
23 Nataliya Rostova, “Pirrova pobeda,” Radio Svoboda, July 4, 2016, accessed August 16, 2016, 
http://www.svoboda.org/a/27835484.html. 
24 Sergei Parkhomenko in discussion with the authors, June 13, 2014. 





informal Club to gather with important politicians and exchange information with 
them. Now, in 1994, they took to design the Moscow Charter. Maria Slonim, who had 
just returned from more than a decade in London to work as the BBC correspondent 
in Moscow, hosted the group at her flat.  
 
These journalists were part of the media elite which appeared in the perestroika 
years. Most of these 26 journalists had at some point of their careers worked for 
foreign news agencies, and were, therefore, familiar with foreign codes of practice.26 
Employed by prominent media outlets in prime positions, they enjoyed prime 
relations with the political world and unfettered access to the highest echelons of 
power. The Club thus became the epicentre of the most high-powered politics-
journalists socialising of that time. Ministers and deputies were frequent guests at 
events Slonim hosted.27 They enjoyed each other’s company, exchanged ideas and 
information, and socialized as like-minded friends.  
 
One of the most important points of these gatherings was that its members trusted 
each other: “We related to one another in confidence,” Slonim recounts. “We knew 
for sure that nobody, even in their wildest dreams, would consider writing about what 
was said in my house off the record.” 28  Tellingly, other journalists were rarely 
admitted, except for some close friends, and the journalists refused to widen their 
circle when, after the release of the Charter, more and more people knocked on the 
door of this exclusive Moscow Club wanting to gain entry. The group’s exclusivity 
was considered its major strength. “No question, we were an influential group, a 
closed group”, Natalya Gevorkyan remembers: “Politicians came to us precisely 
because we were a tiny group. Had we been more open, they would have stopped 
coming. I think we had great influence.”29  
 
If we return to Gel’man’s concept of power maximization, this behavior was very 
rational. It was not that those elitist people maliciously kept other people at bay, but 
the relations they had developed in the perestroika period and in the early post-
Soviet years made them important power brokers who could interact with other 
power actors almost on an equal footing. Socializing with powerful people became an 
aim in itself. Such type of interaction would have suffered badly had this group been 
enlarged.  
 
Being involved in power games with the new political establishment, the journalists, 
however, neglected promoting the Charter. When fellow journalists, inspired and 
enthused by the Charter, approached Club member Sergei Parkhomenko to ask how 
to implement it, he explained to them that they should respect it and internalize its 
value, nothing more.30  He believed that signing the Charter, spreading the word 
through the occasional conversation with junior colleagues and relying on the 
enlighting power his word carries, would be sufficient for the country’s journalists to 
make the principles their own and obey them. His fellow Club members thought the 
same.  
 
This approach to the world was characteristic of post-Soviet Russia. In a backlash 
against a Soviet-type state-imposed collectivism, people avoided any collective 
action and tried to find individual ways to assert their personal interests.31  That 
	
26 “Moskovskaia Khartiia zhurnalistov. Deklaratsiia. 1994 god,” Ekho Moskvy, last modified November 5, 
2011, accessed August 16, 2016, http://echo.msk.ru/blog/echomsk/827401-echo/. 
27 Sergei Parkhomenko in discussion with the authors, June 13, 2014. 
28 Maria Slonim in discussion with the authors, December 25, 2014. 
29 Nataliya Gevorkyan in discussion with the authors, June 3, 2014. 
30 Ibid. 





cooperation within a profession could in due course protect the interests of the 
individual did not appear convincing, consequently the foundation of a professional 
organisation, particularly a trade union, was off the agenda.32 Moreover, nobody from 
the Club would have volunteered to do any work for such a project. Not only were 
they fervently preoccupied with their personal careers, they did not really think it was 
their responsibility to take things further. Today Slonim thinks that this was probably 
a mistake: “We hadn’t thought it through. We probably should have set up some kind 
of structure and seriously pursued it... But nobody found time for such a thing.”33 
 
Thus, the publication of the Charter was followed by a period where many fellow 
journalists welcomed and highly appreciated its content and ideas, but for a whole 
range of reasons hardly anybody actively applied them. Many journalists who were 
eager to embrace the Charter were at a loss. In the early 1990s the large majority of 
journalists in Russia could only dream of the independence the much more privileged 
Club members enjoyed. These ordinary journalists worked for media outlets in which 
interference by business or politicians at all levels was an everyday occurrence. For 
very practical reasons, it was much more difficult for them to abide by the Charter 
and not succumb to the pressure they were exposed to from politicians, bureaucrats 
and employers. Not to forget that they received meagre remuneration for their work. 
It had become a norm for both individual journalists and editors to supplement their 
income by commercialising their journalism and accepting payment in exchange for 
publishing information (something called dzhinsa in Russian). 34  There were no 
professional associations, independent from the state, which could have provided 
journalists with a platform to discuss the problems they faced on a daily basis as well 
as their role in the development of the country. As for the 1994 Moscow Charter, this 
lack of trust in, and commitment to, any professional institution meant that it had very 
little impact. 
 
Many representatives of the young generation raised criticism concerning the group’s 
arrogance and elitism. They saw their older peers as privileged journalists who 
looked down on both the public and lower-rank journalists, whilst at the same time 
trying to teach and enlighten them.35 “I do respect them,” a young journalist tells us, 
“but sadly they were barely more than a closed, elitist circle.”36 “Why, for example, 
did they have to meet up at one person’s flat instead of making things more open 
and transpartent?” another young journalist asked. “This closeness was very 
counterproductive.”37 The Club members’ detachment is a main target of criticism: 
“They proudly wrote from their offices right next to the State Duma and tried to teach 
the masses – an attitude which didn’t go down well with the masses.”38 The overall 
assessment is very negative: “The Charter was not worth the paper it was written 
on.”39 
 
A mere couple of years after the Charter was published, leading Charter cohorts 
demonstrated that they were not yet ready to fully adhere to their own ethical 
principals, succumbing to prioritize fostering their own personal power and influence 
in the country. The journalists’ closeness to the political establishment made them 
	
32 Paul Kubicek, “Civil Society, Trade Unions and Post-Soviet Democratisation: Evidence from Russia 
and Ukraine,” Europe-Asia Studies 54, no. 4 (2002): 603-624. 
33 Maria Slonim in discussion with the authors, December 25, 2014. 
34 Svetlana Pasti, “A New Generation of Journalists” in Arja Rosenolm, Kaarle Nordenstreng and Elena 
Trubina (eds.) Russian Mass Media and Changing Values (London: Routledge, 2010): 61; 
35 REN TV journalist in discussion with the authors, August 8, 2014; former TVC journalist in discussion 
with the authors, June 4, 2014. 
36 Aleksandr Urzhanov in discussion with the authors, June 26, 2014. 
37 Nataliya Rostova in discussion with the authors, June 16, 2014. 






overestimate the endurance and stability of their power. A consequence of this was 
that these journalists deprived themselves of the opportunity to become an 
independent force in society. The unfolding events degraded their status in Russian 
society even further.  
 
The 1996 presidential election campaign: professionalized propaganda 
 
Six months prior to the presidential elections in May 1996, Yeltsin’s approval rating 
was as low as 2 percent.40 The economic collapse had extracted an unnerving toll on 
the populus, and the war in Chechnya was highly unpopular. The voters’ discontent, 
combined with their yearning for stability and social security played into the hands of 
the Communist Party, with their leader Gennadii Ziuganov being the favourite for the 
next presidency.  
 
In this desperate situation the Kremlin political technologists relied on the principal 
tool at their disposal to reach the electorate – the media. A large number of 
journalists weighed into the election campaign, which subsequently became 
increasingly propagandist in nature. They embarked upon a large-scale media 
crusade slaughtering Ziuganov and idealizing Yeltsin. The combined effort of 
numerous journalists, oligarchs and politicians to discredit Zyuganov eventually 
helped Yeltsin secure victory in the second round of the elections in June 1996. 
 
The fiercest and most questionable exponent of this campaign was the newspaper 
entitled Ne dai bog! (God Forbid!). The 10 million color newspaper copies proclaimed 
that, if Ziuganov won, the country would slip into a civil war; mass arrests, executions 
and famine. Ziuganov was repeatedly compared to Hitler. The whole project was 
administered by Kommersant journalists, which had a sad irony: less then a decade 
prior to this, Kommersant was setting the standards for the journalistic community 
and now their staff participated in the most scandalous propaganda campaign.  
 
“We clearly understood that if Ziuganov came to power everything would regress 
very quickly,” the founder of the television channel REN TV, Irena Lesnevskaia, 
summarizes the reason for why her generation willingly participated in the mass 
media onslaught orchestrated by the Kremlin in the 1996 elections.41 Almost the 
whole media community believed that a victory by the Communist Party would mean 
a return to Soviet censorship and repression. “We were all convinced that the 
communists were about to return,” Channel One head Konstantin Ernst asserts.42 
 
Fears of an anti-liberal political direction were strong, but individual private agendas 
were strong too. Famous journalists and influential media managers were especially 
fearful that a return of Soviet censorship would mean a premature end to their 
careers, by killing off the media empires which they were part of. 43  Aleksei 
Malashenko, one of the founders of NTV, joined the presidential campaign to secure 
a separate, privileged frequency for his television channel.44 Even the participants of 
the Moscow Charter did not voice any public concern, so much so that a lot of them 
opted to actively support the Kremlin.   
 
	
40 Daniel Treisman, “Presidential Popularity in a Hybrid Regime: Russia under Yeltsin and Putin,” 
American Journal of Political Science 55, no. 3 (2011): 592. 
41 Irena Lesnevskaia in discussion with the authors, June 12, 2014. 
42 Konstantin Ernst in discussion with the authors, March 13, 2016. 
43 Leonid Parfёnov, “S tvёrdym znakom na kontse,” Channel One, last modified June 1, 2011, accessed 
August 16, 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BMLdc89clvY. 





When we look at how journalists assess the 1996 campaign today, however, we get 
a sharply polarized picture. More than half of the older generation who took part in 
the campaign thinks that they played a vital and positive role in the country’s 
development. Parkhomenko sees himself as a defender of democracy: “We all 
moved in a single direction under the influence one inextricable force, namely the 
distinct understanding that communism and the left wing endanger our main values, 
our professional values.”45  
 
There are very few exceptions to this among the older generation. One is Olga 
Romanova, then deputy editor-in-chief of a leading daily Segodnia. She is one of the 
few who deplore their own role in the campaign. Her assessment is self-depreciating. 
She says that the problems of journalism today go back to 1996 and, in hindsight, 
she considers her role in 1996 to be the biggest mistake in her life:  
All liberal journalists, or those who thought they were liberal, closed their eyes 
for a whole year and worked exclusively for the victory of Yeltsin…In fact, it 
was less about whether Yeltsin wins or not; it was more about whether we 
survive or not. We saw the manipulations; we saw the violations. We saw the 
dishonesty in the negotiations with Zuiganov. We saw what happened to 
Lebed’ [a then very popular presidential candidate and military general] who 
was the used and presented as the viable third candidate to dilute votes. We 
witnessed it all – and it suited us.46  
 
Some people did understand what was going on. Dmitrii Muratov already ran Novaya 
Gazeta in 1996, a weekly focusing on investigative journalism: “We followed an iron 
principle: while everybody around us said that one had to support the smaller evil, we 
understood where this would lead to.”47 Muratov instead supported a small liberal 
party headed by Yavlinsky. “We knew he’d lose, but at least we wouldn’t have to be 
ashamed of our deeds.”48 Others stayed away from the 1996 campaign for political 
reasons, deploring the break-up of the Soviet Union. Aram Gabrelianov, who four 
years after the 1996 elections went about building Russia’s biggest tabloid empire, 
says he hated Yeltsin from soon after 1991 for destroying the USSR and allowing its 
economy to be looted.49  
 
Diametrically opposed to the older (mostly liberal) journalists in our sample are 
representatives of the younger generation of journalists. They are all very critical of 
the events in 1996, liberal ones no less than others, assessing their older colleagues 
participation in the election campaign as highly negative and detrimental to the 
further development of the journalist community. Leonid Bershidskii, the former 
editor-in-chief of the financial daily Vedomosti and founder of the news website Slon, 
now working for Bloomberg, supports Romanova’s assessment; he calls the 1996 
campaign “a disgrace” to the profession and considers “the state propaganda 
machine in Russia today” as “a direct consequence of the 1996 debacle”.50 The 
journalist and writer Oleg Kashin calls it an “absolute disaster, the beginning of the 
descent into all our present day media problems”.51 Former NTV journalist Aleksandr 
Urzhanov is equally resentful: “1996 was a big betrayal of the profession, perpetrated 
by its most respected representatives. ... Even in today’s cynical era, propaganda in 
the run-up to elections wouldn’t reach such a level of impudence.”52 
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The 1996 presidential election campaign caused and accelerated the politicization of 
the Russian media market and the commercialization of politics. The unclean 
methods used in the campaign destroyed any trust in professional ethics and 
professionalism in general. The fact that ethics were jettisoned by everyone meant 
that there was no longer any reason to be afraid of competition on the basis of ethics, 
which parts of the audience might have demanded. The owners of media outlets 
realized that running media during political campaigns was highly lucrative, both in 
terms of profit and political connections.53  
 
For individual journalists who took part in the 1996 propaganda campaign to save 
Yeltsin this meant, at first, a prosperous time – relative independence in their day-to-
day work, good pay, creative freedom. The eventual effect was, however, also very 
negative for them, in as much as that the 1996 campaign radically changed the 
balance of power between journalists and political authorities for the benefit of the 
latter. The journalists' enthusiastic support for the Kremlin, their willingness to 
collaborate as well as take and execute orders signalled to the Kremlin that it could 
rely on the media in case of emergency. Having realized what an important resource 
journalists were, politicians learned how to manipulate them – and how to keep them 
under control. As Leonid Parfёnov stated, in 1996 political journalism, which had 
never properly dissociated itself from power structures, from now on completely 
merged with it.54  
 
The Kremlin realized that the general populus too were prepared to digest 
propaganda-style television and newspapers. Gleb Pavlovskii, a long-time adviser to 
the Kremlin, observed in 2002: “Once the power structures had understood the 
audience’s apathy and readiness to accept propaganda, they started to 
systematically exploit media tools for their own interest.”55 In the second half of the 
1990s the Kremlin’s interventions did not yet have a guaranteed gamechanging 
influence on public opinion. One reason for this was that there were still multiple 
voices heard in mass media, such as on NTV, TV6, Novaya Gazeta or Itogi. 
 
This diversity of the media landscape was, for some time, secured by the fact that 
numerous owners, each of whom pursued their own goals, had control over Russia’s 
media. This fragmentation of Russia’s elites, as Gel’man suggests, was one of the 
reasons why a single power broker was not able to monopolize the power in the 
country in the 1990s. 56  These numerious owners were, however, consistently 
sideleined in the years to come, both by the Kremlin and by regional authorities. The 
information wars of the late 1990s accelerated this process, deprivilng journalists’ 
role as leaders of public opinion and as independent power actors. 
 
Information wars of the 1990s: deathblow to community spirit 
 
Various owners of media outlets in the 1990s used journalists to mudslinging their 
opponents. The information wars started with an auction. The Svyazinvest holding 
had been set up as a holding company to sell off shares in a large number of 
Russian telephone companies and telegraph centres. Now it was up for sale. 
Gusinskii, who was among those who secured Yeltin’s re-election, had his eye on it. 
First, he had not benefited from previous large-scale privatisations and, second, he 
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was the first oligarch who turned his media outlets into a proper business, so it was 
clearly up his street. Boris Berezovskii controlled the majority of shares in a number 
of media outlets (television channels ORT and TV6, the newspapers Nezavisimaia 
Gazeta and Kommersant).57 The government urgently needed money to pay wages 
and pensions and the two oligarchs, in an alliance, were happy to pay a respectable 
sum in exchange for the holding.  
 
Another oligarch, Vladimir Potanin also showed interest in the asset. Potanin had 
managed to capitalize his 1996 commitment to Yeltsin’s re-election by becoming a 
deputy prime minister. With financial backing from George Soros Potanin’s company, 
unexpectedly, won the auction. 58  Gusinskii and Berezovskii were left deceived, 
however, they hoped that if they succeded in pursuading the Kremlin that the 
process had been corrupt, they may get the auction result to be annulled. Using the 
tools and tricks they had deployed during the 1996 election campaign, they started a 
concerted and full blown media attack on the government and Potanin, which 
culminated in the dismissal of several members of the government.  
 
Their accusation that the government sold Potanin state assets for nothing marked 
the beginning of a destructive media war, which ended with the crackdown on 
Gusinskii’s channel NTV in 2001.59 Gusinskii had received a large low interest loan 
from Gazprom (post-1996 elections) to invest in developing his channels a payback 
for his role in assisting Yeltsin’s victory in the elections. However, by the time the 
next electoral campaign began, Gusinskii found himself in a camp hostile to Kremlin. 
He opposed the future president’s party Unity. Recriminations followed Putin’s 
victory; the loan was recalled, Gusinskii was arrested and briefly jailed. He hurridly 
sold his shares to Gazpromedia (owned by the natural gas conglomerate Gazprom) 
and fled the country, leaving his business to the state. The event symbolized the end 
of oligarchic media dominance. The Kremlin took over. 
 
The information wars had a highly destructive impact on the journalist community; it 
split it into two halves, with journalists supporting their respective oligarchs. The 
groups stood hostile towards each other and invested their energy into fighting each 
other.60 As one of the journalists we interviewed cynically commented, in the course 
of the information wars “journalists lost their face and have since been completely 
spineless.”61 “The tragedy of the information wars is that Russian media only very 
briefly experienced freedom”, the owner of the daily Moskovskii Komsomolets, Pavel 
Gusev, deplores. “We had only just left the communist past in order to end up in a 
capitalist present which was rough and brutal.”62 In fact, Gusev himself was part of 
this process. In the early 1990s Gusev turned from a Soviet apparatchik into a 
successful media businessman. He acquired the skills and tricks prevalent at the 
time, and so his publishing house did not refrain from biased political campaigning.63  
 
The attack on NTV revealed the fragility and fragmentation of the journalistic 
community. Fellow journalists did not experience any sense of solidarity, but mainly 
schadenfreude. This was because NTV journalists were well paid and enjoyed 
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prestige: “As an NTV journalist, you instantly got attention and you commanded great 
authority,” a former NTV journalist recalls.64 Moreover, prior to their demise, NTV 
journalists had readily participated in the information wars in exchange for material 
benefits, which clearly contradicted the principles of free speech. Having said that, 
journalists in all the large media organisations did pretty much the same. This led to 
a situation where journalists judged their peers in competitive outlets by their own 
(low) standards, or, in other words, their own unethical approach to journalism. 
Distrust and cynicism came to dominate the journalist world. As a consequence, 
when the NTV journalists took to the street to speak up for fee journalism, few of their 
colleagues from other media outlets trusted them.  
 
Journalists with very different political pursuasions agree on this point.65 For instance, 
the journalist Bershidskii disapproved of the oligarch Gusinskii's use of government 
funds to build his empire: “I, and Vedomosti, did not ally ourselves with Gusinskii. I 
still think Gusinskii deserved it. Gusinskii was clearly using his media to influence 
political decisions, vying for power.”66 Bershidskii did not only disassociate himself 
from Gusinskii, but also denied the dismissed journalists any support:  
Some of the journalists did not deserve it – but, then, others are now part of 
that propaganda machine, so that shows they never really had any 
professional backbone. In any case, back then journalists had no problem 
finding work in Moscow. It was up to you; you could choose to work for 
Gusinskii or do something more worthwhile.67  
 
The end of Gusinskii’s NTV clearly demonstrated the extent to which any sense of 
solidarity and belief in professional ethics had been absent among journalists. The 
journalistic community was already morally weakened, if not severaly damaged, and 
driven by material interests. The aggressive and brutal character of the takeover, and 
what it meant for media freedom in Russia in more general terms, fuelled the already 
hostile emotions. An unquestioning and unquestioned loyalty to the respective owner 
became a key characteristic of post-Soviet journalism. This played into the hands of 
the Kremlin’s strategist to tame the media, thereby making it the central pillar for 
controlling society.68  
 
The information wars ended a period wherein journalists were independent power 
actors. Oligarchic control over the media and the subordination of journalists to their 
owners turned them into employees whose success directly depended on whether 
they pleased their superiors and eventually their owners. After the restructuring of the 
media in the 2000s, the state and Kremlin-loyal oligarchs took control, but the basic 
mechanism stayed the same. One of our interviewees, a Rossiia journalist, justifies 
this situation by referring back to the information wars: “Back then, Gusinskii dictated 
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policy. And the channel followed it. If you didn’t agree, you could just leave. Now the 
majority of media outlets belongs to the state, and the state does the same. If you 
don’t agree, just leave.”69  
 
This subordination to one’s employer (in the 2000s for many the state) was combined 
with another strategy; accuse the accusers (the West, the opposition) of being worse 
than you are in order to undermine their credibility, cheekily called by some 
journalists “whataboutism”. 70  The famous TV presenter, Maksim Shevchenko, a 
representative of the young generation, notes: “[The Russian way of reporting] is not 
any different to what any reporter from the Frankfurter Allgemeine or the Kurier 
experiences... If I put my money into a channel or a newspaper, why should I be 
forced to like everybody? This is why there is such a thing as editorial policy. If the 
state invests money in a media outlet, it has the right to demand that it follows the 
state’s policy.”71  
 
The information wars period was the formative time for journalists to acquire what 
many of them call adekvatnost’, that is, the skills, sensitivity and knowledge to 
navigate one’s professional space. 72  To a large degree this involves sensing, 
accepting and anticipating the (often unspoken) political line, but without journalists 
self-censoring themselves. Too keen self-censorship can make journalism stiff, dull 
and boring, which is not what the media industry needs, having to generate 
productes that secure high audience ratings. To keep the right balance between 
political obedience and creative media products, journalists learned how to live their 
originality and individuality within the overall political limits. Initially, they acquired this 
skill (“creative” conformity) whilst still working for oligarchs-led media outlets. There 
might have been a coercive element at first pushing the phenomenon, but over the 





This article applied Gel’man’s framework of power maximization in post-Soviet 
Russia on the media community in order to trace journalists’ attempts to establish 
ethical norms and explore the reasons why they failed to become a Fourth Estate. 
The application of Gel’man’s concept to Russian media is fruitful, first, because it 
refrains from moral judgements, and, second, because it refrains from seeing 
Russia’s post-Soviet history pre-determined. As Gel’man notes, the road to Putin’s 
authorianism in the 2010s passed multiple milestones and involved various power 
actors who had the option to choose which way to go.  
 
Many journalists were certainly well intentioned in their endeavors and were keen to 
maximize their personal power and influence, not only for their own sake, but also for 
the sake of their country’s development. The majority of journalists who had gained 
prominence in the late 1980-early 1990s, however, overestimated themselves and 
miscalculated their ability to partake in the highest echelons of power. One 
consequence of this collective self-deception was that they neglected the importance 
of contributing to creating a professional association or trade union, which could have 
balanced and staved off pressure from the Kremlin.  
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The attempt to formulate ethical principles of journalism in 1994 could have, in 
theory, provided the foundation of generally accepted guidelines, which in turn could 
have become a driving force for creating an independent and strong journalist 
community, able to resist the Kremlin. The small group of elitist Moscow journalists, 
however, preferred to succour high-ranked politicians and associate with the ruling 
elites, which heavily biased their perception of powerful individuals. In turn, having 
gained the trust of journalists, the authorities proceeded to abuse them by 
manipulating the power of the journalistic word for their own political aims.  
 
The propaganda campaign of 1996 is the most poignant example of how maliable 
and placative journalists had become. Yeltsin’s highly controversial victory, aided by 
the journalists’ readiness to openly endorse propagandist ideas, became a decisive 
turning point towards the de-democratisation of Russia. It became a convenient 
justification for journalists to breach ethical principles. Today, in particular, the young 
generation resent the actions of their predecessors, blaming their senior colleagues 
for selling out basic journalistic principles. 
 
The ensuing period after Yeltsin’s return to power witnessed the continuing 
plundering of victory spoils. The ruling oligarchs gorged on the redistribution of state 
property amongst themselves whence media owners abused their influence and 
power. Journalists were happy to acquiesce and partake in the information wars for 
the sake of remunerations and celebrity careers. The increasingly diverse and 
intricate weapons employed in the notorious information wars were honed in the 
media battles with their fellow colleagues, which further undermined any sense 
solidarity within the journalistic community. Loyalty to the owner became the sole 
overriding mantra of everyday journalistic life.  
 
Journalists pretty quickly adapted to this new environment and rules of engagement, 
defined as adekvatnost’, by which they converted their submission into a supposed 
virtue by perceiving it as professionalism. The sacrifice of Gusinskii’s NTV 
showcased what can happen if you do not toe the most powerful actor’s line. Once 
the Kremlin, directly and indirectly, became the main owner of the media, journalists 
seamlessly switched their loyalty, offering their service to the new master, the state.  
 
In many respects, the 1990s shaped the nature of Russia’s contemporary media 
environment. The decade’s major milestones turned journalists from the powerful 
icons of the perestroika era into what they are today; an atomised group of workers 
in the media industry. The anti-Ukrainian media campaign which started in 2014 bore 
certain similarities with the 1996 campaign and the information wars of the late 
1990s. The absence of ethical guidelines, lack of mutual support and the total loyalty 
to the owner turned journalists again into the propagandists who had no scruples in 
presenting opponents of the Russian regime in the gloomiest light.    
 
Having said that, their current state is a not necessarily an indicator of the further 
demise of journalism in Russia. On the contrary, the passionate discussions about 
the 1990s and what went wrong in that decade are, in turn, a highly important 
learning platform from which to potentially turn things around. Nobody is better 
equipped to do so than the contemporary generation of journalists, who are too 
young to have taken part in the 1990s battles. They are now heavily involved in 
reflecting upon the decade and its consequences, which allows them to use the 
1990s as a repository of valuable lessons to regain professionalism.  
 
 
